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THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES: A 
GUIDELINE TO REMEDY OHIO’S SENTENCING 
DISPARITIES FOR WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINAL 
DEFENDANTS 
 
JOELLE LIVORSE* 
ABSTRACT 
Over the past few decades, white-collar crimes have significantly increased across 
the country, especially in Ohio. However, Ohio’s judges are ill-equipped to handle the 
influx of cases. Unlike federal judges who are guided by the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission’s Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Ohio’s judges have significantly more 
sentencing discretion because the Ohio legislature provides minimal guidance for 
these crimes. As a result, Ohio’s white-collar criminal defendants are experiencing 
dramatic sentencing variations. To solve this problem, Ohio should look to the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines and neighboring states to adopt and create an innovative 
sentencing model tailored to white-collar crime. Unlike the federal system, Ohio fails 
to utilize a matrix style grid—which provides notice and uniformity in sentencing. In 
addition, Ohio should adopt the Federal Sentencing Guideline’s loss threshold 
amounts for white-collar crimes because the ranges in Ohio are too wide and, thereby, 
impose a longer sentence. The smaller ranges used by the federal government helps 
reduce prison terms while providing notice and uniformity to judges, practitioners, 
defendants, and the public. Pennsylvania, Ohio’s neighboring state, also created 
unique and tailored sentencing matrices for specific criminal conduct. A tailored 
sentencing matrix that focuses on white-collar crime would better adapt the sentence 
to the criminal defendant’s wrongdoing. Although the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
have been criticized, they offer visible and uniform benefits that Ohio severely lacks 
for white-collar criminal defendants. If Ohio turns a blind eye to these sentencing 
disparities, a white-collar criminal defendant’s sentence is left to the mercy of a system 
with unfettered judicial discretion and arbitrary sentences. 
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I. INTRODUCTION: OHIO’S SENTENCING DISPARITY FOR WHITE-COLLAR 
CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS 
What if a defendant’s conduct did not determine his prison sentence, but instead 
the sentence depended on a decision to prosecute the defendant at the state or federal 
level? In fact, criminal defendants in Ohio are experiencing this problem today—
particularly white-collar criminal defendants.  Ohio’s lack of an understandable and 
comprehensive felony sentencing model for white-collar criminal defendants results 
in dramatic sentencing variations.1 For example, bribery of a public official in Ohio is 
a felony of the third degree and imposes a sentence of nine to thirty-six months in 
prison.2 Yet in the federal court system, bribery of a public official, also a felony, 
imposes a sentence of zero to six months in prison.3 For a defendant with no criminal 
history, this is a sizeable difference of nine months to three years in state prison, 
compared to a maximum of six months in federal prison. Accordingly, Ohio should 
 
1 See generally Derick R. Vollrath, Losing the Loss Calculation: Toward a More Just 
Sentencing Regime in White-Collar Criminal Cases, 59 DUKE L.J. 1001, 1005 (2010). The 
United States Sentencing Guidelines “were developed to remedy the prevalence of unwarranted 
sentencing disparity.” 
2 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2921.02, 2929.14 (West 2018). 
3 See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, § 2 (2018); compare United 
States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual § 5 (2018). 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol68/iss2/9
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adopt a sentencing model similar to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to reduce 
judicial discretion4 and unpredictability in Ohio’s criminal justice system. 
State court judges in Ohio have significantly more autonomy than federal judges 
when sentencing white-collar criminal defendants. While Ohio judges do rely upon a 
Felony Reference Sheet,5 there are no official guidelines, like in the federal system, 
that mandate certain punishment (or ranges of punishment) for certain criminal 
conduct.6 When sentencing a defendant for a felony, Ohio judicial discretion is 
tethered only to the state law’s overarching purpose. This purpose is to punish the 
offender and protect the public while “using the minimum sanctions . . . without 
imposing an unnecessary burden on state or local government resources.”7 The Ohio 
Revised Code (hereinafter “the Code”) provides for minimum sanctions, but each 
felony has a wide range of sentencing provisions.8 While the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines are by no means a perfect standard, they are important to provide notice to 
a criminal defendant and constrain a defendant’s sentence. Additionally, Ohio should 
follow other states, such as Pennsylvania, which uses matrices that could benefit Ohio 
because a defendant’s punishment is tailored to their specific criminal conduct.9 This 
approach reduces arbitrary sentences for defendants that commit both felony and 
misdemeanor offenses.10 
 The Principle of Legality is a pillar of American criminal law, meaning “no crime 
without law, no punishment without law.”11 With the current sentencing model in 
place, Ohio falls short of upholding this fundamental pillar. There are three interrelated 
corollaries to the legality principle.12 First, criminal statutes should be understandable 
to a reasonable, law-abiding person.13 Second, criminal statutes should be drafted as 
to not delegate basic policy matters.14 Third, ambiguous statutes should “be biased in 
 
4 James S. Gwin, Juror Sentiment on Just Punishment: Do the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
Reflect Community Values?, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 173, 179–80 (2010). 
5 Ohio Criminal Sentencing Commission, Felony Sentencing-Quick Reference Guide (May 
2017). This Felony Reference Sheet includes crimes such as murder, sexual offenses, drug 
crimes, and human trafficking. However, there are no specific references to white-collar crimes. 
6 See KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY & JENNIFER TAUB, CORPORATE AND WHITE COLLAR CRIME 694 
(2017). The Federal Sentencing Guidelines take a tough stance on white-collar criminals. The 
philosophy is that the system can best achieve deterrence by requiring short, but definite prison 
terms. 
7 O.R.C. § 2929.11.  
8 Id. § 2929.14. The statute provides for definite prison terms, for example a felony of the 
first degree imposes a prison term of three to eleven years.  A felony in the second degree 
imposes a prison terms of two to eight years, while a felony of the third degree imposes a 
prison terms of thirty-six months to twelve years, depending on the crime. 
9 See discussion infra Section III.B. 
10 Id. 
11 JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 92 (2012). 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id.; see also Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail Fraud and The Intangible Rights Doctrine: 
Someone to Watch Over Us, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 153, 191–92 (1994). The federal mail fraud 
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favor of the accused,” also known as the Lenity Doctrine.15 Focusing on the first 
corollary, the punishment for committing a crime should be clear to citizens. However, 
Ohio criminal statutes that impose felonies for white-collar offenses permit 
substantially more judicial discretion when sentencing defendants that commit white-
collar crimes than Congress allows federal judges. 
This Note examines the disparity between the sentencing of white-collar 
defendants at the Ohio state court level and at the federal level. Because of Ohio’s lack 
of an understandable and constricted sentencing model,16 the length of a defendant’s 
prison sentence is left at the mercy of the decision to prosecute the defendant at the 
state or national level. This Note proceeds in four parts. Part II provides background 
information about white-collar crimes and why society punishes these offenses. This 
section also examines historical and modern criminal sentencing in the United States 
and Ohio. Part III identifies various aspects of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and 
Pennsylvania’s sentencing model that Ohio should adopt and implement. This section 
also proposes a clear and uniform model for sentencing white-collar criminal 
defendants in Ohio. Additionally, Part III also describes the alleged flaws of the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines and identifies how these “flaws” are actually beneficial 
to the federal government and Ohio. Finally, Part IV briefly concludes.  
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIMES AND HISTORY OF
SENTENCING IN THE UNITED STATES AND OHIO 
A. What Are White-Collar Crimes and Why Do We Punish Them? 
The term “white-collar crime” has expanded and evolved over time.17 Today, the 
public understands white-collar crimes as wrongful acts by one or more trusted 
individuals or corporations that abuse their power and purposely or inadvertently 
injure another individual, corporation, or government agency.18 For example, white-
 
statute is a broad and overarching criminal statute that easily attaches to white-collar offenses 
to bring the claim within the jurisdiction of federal courts. Ms. Moohr argues that the federal 
mail fraud statute is unconstitutionally vague. Hence, the federal statute violates due process 
by “placing ‘unfettered discretion’ in the hands of police, thereby permitting or even 
encouraging arbitrary, discriminatory enforcement.” Id. at 192. 
15 DRESSLER, supra note 11, at 92. John Hasnas, Ethics and The Problem of White Collar 
Crime, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 579, 662 (2005) (“The substantive protections provided by the ban 
on vicarious criminal liability, the mens rea requirement, and principle of legality clearly had 
to be abandoned or relaxed if the statutes against white collar crime were to be enforced.”). 
16 See David J. Diroll, A Decade of Sentencing Reform, A Sentencing Commission Staff 
Report 13 (Mar. 2007). Simplification of Ohio’s sentencing code would make it easier and 
more understandable to practitioners and citizens. 
17 See Lucian E. Dervan & Ellen S. Podgor, “White-Collar Crime”: Still Hazy After All 
These Years, 50 GA. L. REV. 709, 712 (2016). 
18 See Hendrik Schneider, The Corporation as Victim of White Collar Crime: Results from a 
Study of German Public and Private Companies, 22 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 171, 173 
(2015). Dr. Schneider provides a widely accepted definition of white-collar crimes. He 
describes white-collar crime as “illegal or unethical acts that violate fiduciary responsibility of 
public trust committed by an individual or organization, usually during the course of legitimate 
occupational activity, by persons of high or respectable social status for personal or organization 
gain.” Id. However, there many other definitions of white-collar crime. See, e.g., White-Collar 
Crime, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/white-collar-crime (last visited Sept. 10. 2019) 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol68/iss2/9
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collar crimes include insider trading, embezzlement, bribery, racketeering, and more. 
In addition, access to the media and technology helped the public comprehend and 
mold the image of white-collar offenses.19 Over the past few decades, white-collar 
crimes, also known as economic crimes in Ohio, have significantly increased.20 For 
example, in 2001, the Federal Bureau of Investigation created a task force to handle 
the Enron scandal which was “the most complex white-collar criminal investigation 
in its history.”21 Not only are economic crimes dangerous on a national level,22 but 
these crimes also pose a major threat in Ohio.23 In 2015, the economic crime rate in 
Ohio was 17.3% higher than the violent crime rate.24 Because of the rise in white-
collar offenses, Congress implemented new policies and reforms.25 An essential 
 
(“These [white-collar] crimes are characterized by deceit, concealment, or violation of trust and 
are not dependent on the application or threat of physical force or violence. The motivation 
behind these crimes is financial—to obtain or avoid losing money, property, or services or to 
secure a personal or business advantage.”). 
19 Many multimillion-dollar blockbusters are based on real and infamous white-collar offenses 
and their perpetrators. For example, The Wolf of Wall Street recounts Jordan Belfort’s 
fraudulent career as a “successful” stockbroker on Wall Street. Belfort engaged in a series of 
corrupt activities that caused him to plead guilty to an array of crimes related to a penny-stock 
scam. However, even though Belfort scammed innocent Americans of millions of dollars, he 
only spent twenty-two months in prison. WOLF OF WALL STREET (Paramount Pictures 2013); 
see INSIDE JOB (Sony Pictures Classic 2010); Madoff (Amazon 2016); White Collar (USA 
Network 2014). See generally Geraldine Szott Moohr, White Collar Movies and Why They 
Matter, 16 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 119 (2015). 
20 See Stephen Labaton, Downturn and Shift in Population Feed Boom in White-Collar Crime, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2002, at A1, 29. 
21 See Enron, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/enron (last visited Sept. 10, 
2019). Public investors, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), and Enron’s own 
board of directors had no idea that Enron’s reported financial statements were “grossly 
inaccurate.” John R. Kroger, Enron, Fraud, and Securities Reform: An Enron Prosecutor’s 
Perspective, 76 U. Colo. L. Rev. 57, 71 (2005). These inaccuracies were so misleading that 
Enron disguised a $622 million loss as $2.4 billion in profit. Id. at 73.  Consequently, Congress 
enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to help avoid another Enron catastrophe. See infra note 25 & 
26. 
22 According to the United States Sentencing Commission’s most recent study, 10% of the 
federal court’s caseload stems from the economic crime guidelines in Section 2B1.1. Courtney 
Semisch, What Does Federal Economic Crime Really Look Like?, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2 
(2019). Section 2B1.1 is one of the five most frequently applied guidelines in federal sentencing. 
Id. at 3. 
23 Jimmy Dimora, the former Cuyahoga County Commissioner, was convicted of 
racketeering and thirty-two bribery and corruption charges. Rachel Dissell, Jimmy Dimora 
Sentenced to 28 Years in Prison, Defense Attorney Calls it a ‘Death Sentence’, 
CLEVELAND.COM (July 31, 2012), 
https://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2012/07/jimmy_dimora_sentenced_to.html.  
24 Alan Wedd, Economic Crime in Ohio Report 2015, OHIO DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY 9 (2015).  
25See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 107 Stat. 745 (2002) [hereinafter 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act]. On July 30, 2002, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to 
establish tighter regulations on the security industry and to protect investors. The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act enhanced white-collar crime penalties. Specifically, § 905 directed the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission to review the two aspects of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and 
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2020
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reason the government penalizes these offenders is the high cost imposed on thousands 
of innocent Americans due to the wrongful actions of one individual or corporate 
entity.26 These financial losses can significantly impact, or even destroy, the financial 
livelihood of innocent citizens and shareholders through their pensions, retirement 
plans, and, indirectly, through the economy.27 Therefore, the punishment of white-
collar crime is necessary to advance the welfare of the public, sustain the national 
economy, and protect the wealth of innocent Americans.28 
 
verify that the punishment supports the offender’s conduct. First, the Commission must ensure 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines “reflect the serious nature of the offense . . . the growing 
incidence of serious fraud offenses, and the need to deter and punish such offenses.” Second, 
the Commission must consider “whether a specific offense characteristic should be added in 
order to provide stronger penalties for fraud committed by a corporate officer or director.” Id. 
In addition, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act to regulate the financial industry, particularly those on Wall Street. See 12 U.S.C. § 53 
(2018). 
26 Wilson Meeks, Corporate and White-Collar Crime Enforcement: Should Regulation and 
Rehabilitation Spell an End to Corporate Criminal Liability?, 40 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 
77, 78 (2006). See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Former CEO of Arthrocare 
Corporation Convicted for Orchestrating $750 Million Securities Fraud Scheme (Aug. 18, 
2017) (convicting former CEO of a securities scheme that defrauded shareholders of more than 
$750 million.); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Volkswagen AG Agrees to Plead Guilty 
and Pay $4.3 Billion in Criminal and Civil Penalties; Six Volkswagen Executives and 
Employees are Indicted in Connection with Conspiracy to Cheat U.S. Emissions Tests (May 3, 
2018) (pleading guilty to three felony counts and fined $2.8 billion in criminal penalties as a 
result of a long-term scheme to defraud the revenue of the United States and lying and 
obstructing justice to further the scheme.); see also Felicia Smith, Madoff Ponzi Scheme 
Exposes “The Myth of the Sophisticated Investor”, 40 U. BALT. L. REV. 215, 219–20 (2010). 
Bernie Madoff defrauded investors of an estimated $64.8 billion that impacted “hedge fund 
managers, charities, pension funds, retirees, celebrities, and self-described ‘average 
Americans.’” See also Elizabeth Cosenza, Rethinking Attorney Liability Under Rule 10B-5 In 
Light of the Supreme Court’s Decisions in Tellabs and Stoneridge, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 
3–4 (2008). At the turn of the 21st century, the Enron Corporation was the seventh-largest 
company in the United States, employed about 21,000 people, had $60 billion in assets, and had 
an annual income of more than $100 billion. Yet, Enron collapsed as a result of numerous illegal 
corporate schemes and left investors suffering losses of more than $40 billon. Between 2002 
and 2007, more than 200 CEOs, 50 CFOs, and 120 Vice-Presidents were convicted of white-
collar crimes at the federal level. EUGENE SOLTES, WHY THEY DO IT: INSIDE THE MIND OF THE 
WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINAL 41 (2016). 
27 “While violent crimes may well provoke widespread community outrage more readily than 
crimes involving monetary loss, economic crimes are certainly capable of rousing public 
passions, particularly when thousands of unsuspecting people are robbed of their livelihoods 
and retirement savings.” Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 449 (2010); see also Meeks, 
supra note 26, at 88. If a company is charged with participating or orchestrating in a crime, the 
fines may be shifted to shareholders and consumers in the economy. A corporation can raise its 
prices to help offset the egregious fines imposed, which ultimately harm consumers and the 
economy by inflating prices. Id.  
28 White-collar crimes are more significant than street crimes from a purely economic 
perspective and often have the capacity to weaken trust and faith in the basic institutions of 
society. STANTON WHEELER, SITTING IN JUDGMENT: THE SENTENCING OF WHITE-COLLAR 
CRIMINALS 2–3 (1988). 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol68/iss2/9
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B. History of Sentencing in the United States 
To understand and appreciate sentencing in the United States, we must first 
examine the origins of our legal system. Old English common law has greatly 
influenced American jurisprudence. Throughout the eighteenth century, English 
judges had to determine the punishment for an individual’s crime without any 
standards to help decide a defendant’s punishment.29 Consequently, judges imposed 
severe penalties and sentences for a wide array of crimes.30 The realization of the need 
for reform grew and spread across Europe,31 but many resisted this philosophy.32 
Ultimately, the ideology of sentencing reform spread to and influenced the American 
colonies. 
 In the early colonial period, the primary sentences for offenders were isolation 
and punishment.33 An individual that committed a white-collar crime was fined and 
forced to pay restitution.34 Before the American Civil War, many courts abandoned 
their “traditional” mechanisms and began to incarcerate criminal defendants.35 
Following this ideology, Dr. Benjamin Rush, a signer of the Declaration of 
Independence, delivered an influential speech at the home of Benjamin Franklin in 
1787 regarding the establishment of a prison system in the United States.36 Rush’s 
 
29 SANDRA SHANE-DUBOW ET AL., SENTENCING REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES: HISTORY, 
CONTENT, AND EFFECT 1 (1985). 
30 Id. The judges sentenced individuals that committed violent felonies, such as murder, and 
treason to death. Yet, minor crimes, such as petty theft or cutting a tree from another’s property, 
were also punished as capital crimes. During this period, the English criminal code contained 
more than two hundred capital crimes. 
31 Id. In 1764, Cesare Beccaria––considered one of the greatest thinkers of the Age of 
Enlightenment––published On Crimes and Punishment. See CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES 
AND PUNISHMENT 113 (1764). Beccaria demanded that “punishment should not be an act of 
violence perpetrated by one or many upon a private citizen, it is essential that it should be 
public, speedy, necessary, the minimum possible in the given circumstances, proportionate to 
the crime, and determined by the law.” 
32 SHANE-DUBOW ET AL., supra note 29, at 2. In 1765, the Roman Catholic Church 
denounced Beccaria as a heretic and “socialist.” The following year, the Church categorized 
On Crimes and Punishments as a condemned book. Even, philosopher Immanuel Kant 
disagreed with Beccaria’s demand to end capital punishment. Kant argued that “society must 
impose capital punishment in order to maintain a system based upon the individual’s inherent 
worth as an individual and his right to receive punishment . . . .” 
33 Alan M. Dershowitz, Criminal Sentencing in the United States: An Historical and 
Conceptual Overview, 423 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACADEMY OF POL. AND SOC. SCI. 117, 118 
(1976) “Colonial Americans used a variety of nonincarcerative techniques to protect their 
communities from the threat of crime.” Id. at 124. 
34 Id. “Offenders who simply could not pay were sentenced to forced labor, whipped, placed 
in the stocks or branded with a symbol of their offense.” Id. at 124–25. 
35 Id. at 125. These jurisdictions abandoned “flogging, whipping, branding, and other 
corporal punishments.” 
36 Id. Dr. Rush envisioned a prison system that would “(1) establish various inmates 
“classification” programs, for purpose of both inmate housing assignments and various 
“treatment” plans; (2) devise a self-supporting institutional system based on inmate piecework 
and agriculture; and (3) impose indeterminate periods of confinement on inmates who would 
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2020
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belief in an isolated prison system, rather than public punishments, spread and evolved 
across the country. Society soon began to understand the functionality of the prison 
system and major reforms of sentencing power were implemented across the 
country.37 Consequently, legislatures proposed ranges for criminal offenses, but 
judges retained the ultimate power to determine a defendant’s sentence.38 As a result, 
white-collar criminal defendants received inconsistent sentences before the 
implementation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.39 
C. Modern Sentencing in the United States 
By the 1980s, it became clear that the United States had to solve its sentencing 
disparity problem, especially for white-collar criminal defendants.40 Congress passed 
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which established and required the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission to create a set of guidelines to assist federal judges when 
sentencing criminal defendants.41 The U.S. Sentencing Commission also revised 
 
then be released on the basis of evidence of their progress towards “rehabilitation.” Beccaria’s 
On Crimes and Punishment may have influenced Dr. Rush’s ideology. DAVID FREEMAN 
HAWKE, BENJAMIN RUSH: REVOLUTIONARY GADFLY 364 (1971). 
37 Dershowitz, supra note 33, at 128. By 1922, thirty-seven states established indeterminate 
sentencing models and seven states had similar parole systems. 
38 Nancy Gertner, A Short History of American Sentencing: Too Little Law, Too Much Law, 
or Just Right, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 691, 696 (2010). 
39 See United States v. Bergman, 416 F. Supp. 496, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (sentencing 
defendant who stole more than $1,000,000 to four months in prison); United States v. 
Browder, 398 F. Supp. 1042, 1043, 1047 (D. Or. 1975) (sentencing defendant who stole 
$500,000 to twenty-five years in prison). These two cases demonstrate the exact problem 
courts across the country faced—two federal district courts sentenced two defendants that 
committed similar white-collar offenses to vastly different sentence terms because of the lack 
of a uniform sentencing model. See also Jeffrey S. Parker, The Economics of Mens Rea, 79 
VA. L. REV. 741, n.44 (1993). 
40 “We are all aware of the great variation in sentencing practices . . . . It must be ranked as 
one of our foremost problems in the administration of justice . . . . Terms for forgery range 
from nine months in Maine and the Southern District of New York to sixty-three months in 
Oklahoma and fifty-eight months in Western Arkansas.” Attorney General Robert F. 
Kennedy, Address at Joint Sentencing Institute of the Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Judicial 
Circuits (Oct. 12, 1961). The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 became a solution. 
Congress enacted The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 for two purposes: honesty in 
sentencing and the reduction of unjustifiable sentence disparities. See Justice Stephen Breyer, 
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 4 (1988) (“Honesty in sentencing” refers to the offender serving the 
imposed sentence from the judge, excluding “good time.”). 
41 Breyer, supra note 40, at 5. The U.S. Sentencing Commission includes seven members—
three of which are federal judges, appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. 
Currently, five of the seven voting positions, including the Chair, are vacant on the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission. The two Commissioners are Judge Charles R. Breyer (Northern 
District of California) and Judge Danny C. Reves (Eastern District of Kentucky). Four 
affirmative votes are required to amend the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, but there are only two 
voting members on the Commission. Hence, zero changes can occur to the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines. Organization, U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, https://www.ussc.gov/about/who-
we-are/organization (last visited Sept. 2, 2019). Many believe these vacancies are due to 
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol68/iss2/9
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federal probation laws to provide judges with a wider range of sentencing options, and 
considerably abolished parole in the federal system.42 
Today, the U.S. Sentencing Commission43 is responsible for establishing policies 
and practices for sentencing in the federal criminal justice system.44 More specifically, 
the U.S. Sentencing Commission provides a range of guidelines for a specific offense 
and class of offender.45 In federal court, the judge normally determines the offender’s 
sentence within the range of the guidelines, but may stray from the suggested range 
under specific circumstances.46  
The best method to understand the Federal Sentencing Guidelines is to examine 
the seven steps that federal judges use when sentencing white-collar criminal 
defendants.47 The first step is to calculate the base offense level, which can be 
determined from the guidelines manual and the forty-three level offense table 
promulgated by the U.S. Sentencing Commission.48 In step two, the judge examines 
specific offense characteristics of that particular crime to determine the gravity of the 
crime.49 Steps three and four allow the judge to adjust the offense level if deemed 
 
President Trump’s lack of appointing individuals for the Commission or the Senate failing to 
confirm his nominees, such as William Otis. 
42 BRICKEY & TAUB, supra note 6, at 694. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 also raised 
fines for offenses. 
43 See 28 U.S.C. § 994 (2018). This statue provides a duty of the U.S. Sentencing Commission 
to create guidelines for punishing criminal defendants in the federal court system. 
44 United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, § 1A, intro, comment. 1 (2016). 
45 Id. § 2. However, the offense range must be narrow: the maximum cannot exceed the 
minimum by more than 25% of 6 months. 
46 Id. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 222 (2005) (holding that the provision of the 
Federal Sentencing Act that made the guidelines mandatory and set forth a standard of review 
would be severed to maintain the validity of the Act.). The Court noted that “[t]hese features of 
the remaining system . . . continue to move sentencing in Congress’ preferred direction, helping 
to avoid excessive sentencing disparities while maintaining flexibility sufficient to individualize 
sentences where necessary.” Id. at 264–65. Therefore, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are 
not mandatory, but rather an important advisory to federal judges when sentencing criminal 
defendants. See also Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007) (explaining that “a district 
court should begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable 
Guidelines range.”); see infra note 50. 
47 BRICKEY & TAUB, supra note 6, at 695. 
48 Id. The purpose of step one is to rank the severity of the offenses. See USSG § 1A2.2 
(“[The] advisory guideline system continues to assure transparency by requiring that 
sentences be based on articulated reasons stated in open court that are subject to appellate 
review.”). 
49 BRICKEY & TAUB, supra note 6, at 696. For example, the Guidelines provide that the 
crime of fraud is a level 6 offense. However, the magnitude of the crime can increase 
depending on the estimated or probable loss from the committed fraud. If the loss is $5,000 
or less, the crime remains a level 6 offense; but if the loss is higher the offense level can 
increase 1 to 18 levels. These increases can significantly impact a judge’s decision to sentence 
the criminal defendant to a longer prison sentence. Id. For example, when the loss in mail 
fraud is more than $70,000–rather than $10,000–the recommended sentence doubles. Gwin, 
supra note 4, at 181. 
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appropriate and if the defendant is convicted of multiple counts.50 Step five, an 
important and unique aspect of the federal sentencing system, allows a two level 
decrease in the base offense level if the defendant “clearly demonstrates acceptance 
of personal responsibility for his offense.”51 Step six allows the judge to consider a 
defendant’s prior criminal history.52 Finally, in the last step, the court utilizes the 
sentencing table53 to determine where the criminal defendant’s conduct lies and 
imposes a sentence within the designated range.54 
D. Ohio’s Sentencing Structure 
In 1974, the Ohio General Assembly “completely revised” its legal system and 
ratified uniform sentencing for all crimes.55 Initially, Ohio’s revised sentencing 
structure for felonies included first, second, third, and fourth degree felony categories 
with large sentencing disparities between the categories.56 Ultimately, this structure 
 
50 BRICKEY & TAUB, supra note 6, at 696. A judge can adjust the offense level from a variety 
of factors, such as an unusually vulnerable victim, defendant’s role in the offense (whether 
aggravating or mitigating), or obstruction of justice. Additionally, the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines stipulate “procedures for grouping closely related counts, for determining the 
offense level applicable to each group of counts, and for determining the combined offense 
level.” 
51 United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, § 3E (2018). There are 
numerous considerations that are relevant in determining whether the defendant qualifies for 
the two level decrease. For example, “truthfully admitting the conduct comprising the 
offense(s) of conviction, and truthfully admitting or not falsely denying any additional 
relevant conduct for which the defendant is accountable under §1B1.3 . . . . [V]oluntary 
termination or withdrawal from criminal conduct or associations; voluntary payment of 
restitution prior to adjudication of guilt; voluntary surrender to authorities promptly after 
commission of the offense; voluntary assistance to authorities in the recovery of the fruit and 
instrumentalities of the offense; voluntary resignation from the offense or position held during 
the commission of the offense; post-offense rehabilitative efforts; and the timeliness of the 
defendant’s conduct in manifesting the acceptance of responsibility.” 
52 BRICKEY & TAUB, supra note 6, at 697. This step allows the court to consider the number 
and seriousness of a defendant’s prior offenses. Thus, step six does not affect first-time 
offenders. 
53 Id. at 698. The sentencing table is a grid containing vertical and horizontal columns. The 
vertical column ranks offenses by their severity; a level one offense is the least severe while a 
level forty-three represents the most severe offense level. The horizontal column increases 
severity depending on the criminal defendant’s prior criminal history. 
54 Id. 
55 SHANE-DUBOW ET AL., supra note 29, at 213. Ohio’s statutes provided certain criteria 
Judges were required to consider to impose a defendant’s sentence; including (1) the nature and 
circumstances of the offense, (2) the history, character, and condition of the offender, (3) the 
offender’s need for correctional and rehabilitative treatment; and (4) the resources and ability 
of the offender to pay fines. See Harry J. Lehman & Alan E. Norris, Some Legislative History 
and Comments on Ohio’s New Criminal Code, 23 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 8, 9 (1974) (discussing that 
the Technical Committee responsible for drafting the new criminal code relied on revised 
criminal codes from Illinois, New York, Wisconsin, and the Model Penal Code of the American 
Law Institute). 
56 See 1972 H 511.  
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left a lot for the judge to determine.57 Seven years later, the General Assembly’s 
concern for repeat offenders led to the enactment of Senate Bill 199,58 which created 
“aggravated felony” ranges and “repeat aggravated felonies.”59 Yet, Ohio’s legal 
system still encountered problems,60 which led the General Assembly to enact Senate 
Bill 2 in 1996.61 Senate Bill 2 reformed felony sentencing in Ohio.62  
Today, Ohio is experiencing the same problem the United States had before the 
existence of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines—disparity in sentencing white-collar 
criminal defendants. Similar to the federal system, the Ohio Criminal Sentencing 
Commission is responsible for creating a uniform criminal sentencing code.63 Unlike 
the federal system, Ohio does not use a matrix-style grid to guide judges in felony 
sentencing.64 Sara Koenig, host of the widely-popular podcast, Serial, spoke perfectly 
about Ohio’s current sentencing structure for criminal defendants: 
There are sentencing guidelines of course spelled out in 
excruciating detail in the Ohio Revised Code and I’d assumed the 
guidelines meant that sentencing was fairly mechanical. A certain 
kind of charge would produce a certain kind of sentence, plus or 
minus a little wiggly room in the margin to account for special 
circumstances or whatever else. But it’s not like that. County judges 
in Ohio have a lot of leeway in sentencing, a lot of discretion to 
interpret what punishment consists of, what danger to the public 
looks like. Leeway, discretion, that’s power by another name.65 
 
 
57 Ohio’s first attempt at sentencing reform gave state judges immense discretion. For 
example, a first degree felony imposed a sentence range of 4 to 25 years; second degree felony 
imposed 2 to 15 years; third degree felony imposed 1 to 10 years; and a fourth degree felony 
imposed 6 months to 5 years. SHANE-DUBOW ET AL., supra note 29, at 213. 
58 JOHN WOOLREDGE ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, THE IMPACT OF OHIO’S SENATE BILL 2 
ON SENTENCING DISPARITIES 5 (2002) [hereinafter OHIO SENTENCING WHITE PAPER]. 
59 Id. The legislation “added eight new prison sentence ranges to the original four ranges from 
the 1974 criminal code.” 
60 See Diroll, supra note 16, at 11. 
61 See S.2, 121st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1996). 
62 WOOLREDGE ET AL., supra note 58, at 4. Senate Bill 2 provided key changes, such as 
truthing-in-sentencing, a broad continuum of sanctions, expanded the right of victims, and 
offered guidance by offense level and appellate review. Before S.B. 2, convicted felons were 
administered indeterminate and determinate sentences. For example, an indeterminate sentence, 
such as four to twelve years, allowed the Ohio Parole Board to release felons early or hold 
them for longer periods. Conversely, determinate sentences require release after the offender 
has served a fixed term. Diroll, supra note 16, at 11. 
63 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 181.24 (West 2018). 
64 A key characteristic of sentencing in Ohio is the state’s rejection of the grid sentencing 
system and presumptive sentencing ranges. Ohio rejected this structure to afford greater 
judicial discretion. DAVID DIROLL & SCOTT ANDERSON, OHIO CRIMINAL SENT’G COMM’N, 
JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING AFTER BLAKELY AND BOOKER 12 (2005). 
65 Sara Koenig, You’ve Got Some Gauls, SERIAL (Sept. 21, 2018), 
https://serialpodcast.org/season-three/2/youve-got-some-gauls (emphasis added). 
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Currently, Ohio’s criminal penalties are described in lengthy detail in section 2929 
of the Code.66 Section 2929.12(B) provides a list of non-exhaustive factors the 
sentencing court shall consider to determine if the offender’s conduct is “more serious 
than conduct normally constituting the offense.”67 Similarly, section 2929.12(C) 
provides various mitigating factors.68 Ohio judges may also consider other factors to 
determine if the offender will commit a future crime.69 The decision to implement 
Ohio’s sentencing structure into criminal statutes has caused the system to be 
complex70 and difficult to comprehend and apply.71  
The Ohio Criminal Sentencing Commission suggested a necessary topic for further 
study: the simplification of Ohio’s felony sentencing code.72 The Ohio Criminal 
Sentencing Commission acknowledged that the sentencing structure “adds untold 
hours to the workloads of judges, prosecutors, [and] defense attorneys . . . .”73 
Furthermore, Ohio’s sentencing structure makes it “extremely difficult for offenders, 
victims, and the media to understand criminal sentences.”74 It also recognized that 
Ohio should “streamline and simplify” section 2929 of the Code to make it easier for 
 
66 See O.R.C. § 2929.14. 
67 Id. These factors include: “(1) [t]he physical or mental injury suffered by the victim of 
the offense due to the conduct of the offender was exacerbated because of the physical or 
mental condition or age of the victim; (2) [t]he victim of the offense suffered serious physical, 
psychological, or economic harm as a result of the offense; (3) [t]he offender held a public 
office or position of trust in the community, and the offense related to that office or position; 
(4) [t]he offender’s occupation, elected office, or profession obliged the offender to prevent 
the offense or bring others committing it to justice; (5) [t]he offender’s professional reputation 
or occupation, elected office, or profession was used to facilitate the offense or is likely to 
influence the future conduct of others; (6) [t]he offender’s relationship with the victim 
facilitated the offense; (7) [t]he offender committed the offense for hire or as part of an 
organized criminal activity; [or] (8) [i]n committing the offense, the offender was motivated 
by prejudice based on race, ethnic background, gender, sexual orientation or religion . . . .” 
Id. § 2929.12 (emphasis added). 
68 Id. § 2929.12(C). These factors include, but are not limited to, the following: “(1) [t]he 
victim induced or facilitated the offense; (2) [i]n committing the offense, the offender acted 
under strong provocation; (3) [i]n committing the offense, the offender did not cause or expect 
to cause physical harm to any person or property; [or] (4) [t]here are substantial grounds to 
mitigate the offender’s conduct, although the grounds are not enough to constitute a defense.” 
69 Id. § 2929.12(E). These factors include, but are not limited to: “(1) [p]rior to committing 
the offense, the offender has not been adjudicated a delinquent child; (2) [p]rior to committing 
the offense, the offender had not been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a criminal offense; (3) 
[p]rior to committing the offense, the offender has led a law-abiding life for a significant 
number of years; (4) [t]he offense was committed under circumstances not likely to recur; [or] 
(5) [t]he offender shows genuine remorse for the offense.” 
70 Since Senate Bill 2’s enactment, Ohio’s felony sentencing code has become “remarkably 
complex.” Diroll, supra note 16, at 13. 
71 Id. The convoluted sentencing structure makes it difficult apply Ohio’s criminal statutes. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
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citizens and attorneys to understand.75 Therefore, a simple model, similar to the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, would foster more consistency in Ohio’s criminal 
justice system.76  
Not only is Ohio’s sentencing system complex and confusing, but it allows Ohio 
judges to retain too much discretion when sentencing criminal defendants.77 For 
example, if a defendant pleads guilty to a crime in the federal system, the offender’s 
acceptance of responsibility automatically decreases the offense by two levels.78 But 
Ohio is vastly different because this decrease is not automatic; rather, it is the judge’s 
decision to consider a guilty plea when sentencing the defendant.79 A report by the 
National Center for State Courts supports that Ohio has one of the most voluntary and 
discretionary sentencing structures in the United States.80 The report established a 
“Sentencing Guideline Continuum” that measures how each state’s sentencing 
guidelines affect judicial discretion.81 Ohio received the lowest score possible—a 
score of one—on the continuum scale.82 Simply put, Ohio’s “state sentencing 
guidelines” provide too much discretion to judges compared to other states in the 
nation.83 
 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 22. A sentencing model that provides “more felony levels with narrower sentence 
ranges” could foster more consistency in the legal system. 
77 WOOLREDGE ET AL., supra note 58, at 11. 
78 United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, § 3E1.1 (2018). 
79 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.12(E) (West 2018). 
80 NEAL B. KAUDER & BRIAN J. OSTROM, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES: PROFILES AND CONTINUUM 5 (2008). The continuum seeks to “compare and 
contrast six common characteristics that define and differentiate” sentencing guideline systems 
in different states. 
81 Id. The lower the score on the continuum, the more voluntary the state’s sentencing 
guidelines. This allows for higher rates of judicial discretion when sentencing criminal 
defendants. A higher the score on the continuum means that the state’s sentencing guideline are 
more mandatory and, therefore, judges have less discretion. The continuum assigned points to 
each state based on its answer to the following six questions: “(1) Is there an enforceable rule 
related to guideline use? (2) Is the completion of a worksheet or structured scoring form 
required? (3) Does a Sentencing Commission regularly report on guideline compliance? (4) 
Are compelling and substantial reasons required for departures? (5) Are written reasons 
required for departures? (6) Is there appellate review of defendant-based challenges related to 
sentencing guidelines?” Each state is awarded 0, 1 or 2 points based on its answer. North 
Carolina was the only state to receive the maximum score of 12. 
82 Id. at 5. Ohio was only one of two states to score a 1—the other was Wisconsin. 
83 See id. In response to the National Center for State Court’s questions, these were Ohio’s 
answers. In response to question (1), Ohio’s guidelines have moved towards an advisory 
sentencing system. Following question (2), judges in Ohio are not required to complete 
guidelines worksheets. Question (3), there no statistics for Ohio regarding sentencing patterns 
or practices. Question (4), Ohio judges may stray from the state’s guidelines, but no 
substantial or compelling reason is required. Question (5), no written reasons are required. 
Question (6), the sentencing departures are not subject to appeal. 
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III. OHIO SHOULD ADOPT SIMPLE, CONSISTENT, AND UNPREJUDICIAL 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES FOR WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS 
Disparity in sentencing occurs when offenders with comparable prior records 
commit similar crimes, but are punished or sentenced differently from each other.84 
Ohio should adopt a sentencing model similar to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to 
reduce judicial discretion, unpredictability, and unwarranted sentencing disparities in 
Ohio’s criminal justice system.85 In Ohio, the wide-ranging prison terms that judges 
rely on are extensively listed in section 2929.14 of the Code.86  
Ohio’s sentencing structure creates unwarranted sentencing disparities for white-
collar criminal defendants because offenders that commit similar crimes often receive 
vastly different sentences. Yet, scholars across the country discovered that the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines reduced sentencing disparities for criminal defendants.87 The 
U.S. Sentencing Commission conducted a survey to support these findings.88 Thirty-
two percent of federal District Court judges “strongly agreed” that the federal 
sentencing guidelines reduced unwarranted sentencing disparities of defendants with 
similar prior records.89 Similarly, forty-six percent of federal judges “somewhat 
agreed” to this notion.90 Hence, federal judges across the country support the national 
structure because the Federal Sentencing Guidelines achieve their purpose. 
 
A. Ohio Should Adopt the Federal System’s Threshold Loss Amounts 
A central difference between the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Ohio’s 
sentencing model is the threshold loss amount required for an increase in the offense 
 
84 Richard S. Frase, Why Have U.S. State and Federal Jurisdictions Enacted Sentencing 
Guidelines?, U. OF MINN. (Mar. 25, 2015), https://sentencing.umn.edu/content/why-have-us-
state-and-federal-jurisdictions-enacted-sentencing-guidelines. 
85 For example, Ohio has failed to track the progress and effectiveness of its sentencing 
structure, especially in Cuyahoga County. See Koenig, supra note 65 (stating “[t]his is 
possibly the most profound and least examined question in the building: What works? The 
court doesn’t gather statistics on sentencing, and that’s true for most of the country by the 
way, no data that says defendants in Cuyahoga County do better after 6 months of probation 
than after 3 years of probation, or in terms of reoffending, 4 years in prison yields better results 
than 7 years in prison. We just don’t know—which I found rather astounding that no one is 
tracking this. . . . [B]ut there’s no database locally or nationally, that shows what works.”). 
86 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.01 (West 2018); see supra Section II.D. 
87 See Lydia Brashear Tiede, The Impact of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Reform: 
A Comparative Analysis, 30 JUST. SYS. J. 34 (2009). 
88 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, RESULTS OF SURVEY OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES, 
JANUARY 2010 THROUGH MARCH 2010 tbl. 2 (2010). 
89 Id. at tbl. 20. 
90 Id. Six hundred and twenty-nine federal judges answered this question, while only ten 
judges abstained. Only six percent of federal judges were “neutral” on this question, nine 
percent “somewhat disagreed,” and seven percent “strongly disagreed.” In addition, seventy-six 
percent of federal judges “strongly agreed” or “somewhat agreed” that the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines have increased certainty in meeting the purposes of sentencing. A purpose of the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines was to reduce disparities in sentencing criminal defendants. 
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level. Ohio should adopt a similar form of the threshold loss amounts from the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines because the loss thresholds between felony levels in Ohio are 
too great. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines specify various definitions of loss.91 In 
white-collar crimes, the loss calculation is “a critical determinant of the length of a 
defendant’s sentence.”92 This loss calculation is critical because the loss is directly 
correlated to the heart of the crime itself;93 whether the offense is a form of fraud, 
embezzlement,94 an international Ponzi scheme, or another white-collar crime.95 
Therefore, we must compare the required loss amounts in the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines to Ohio’s requirements in the Code.96  
 
 
91 The USSG identify several types of loss. For example, actual loss is the “reasonably 
foreseeable pecuniary harm that resulted from the offense.” In addition, intended loss requires 
two prongs: (1) intended loss is the pecuniary harm that the defendant purposely sought to 
inflict; and (2) the intended pecuniary harm that would have been impossible or unlikely to 
occur. Another form of loss, pecuniary harm, means the harm that is monetary or otherwise 
readily measurable in money. Therefore, pecuniary harm “does not include emotional distress, 
harm to reputation, or other non-economic harm.” Lastly, reasonably foreseeable pecuniary 
harm includes the “harm that the defendant knew or, under the circumstances, reasonably should 
have known, was a potential result of the offense.” United States Sentencing Commission, 
Guidelines Manual, § 2B1.1, comment. 3 (2018). 
92 United States v. Rutkoske, 506 F.3d 170, 179 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Diana B. Henriques, 
Madoff Is Sentenced to 150 Years for Ponzi Scheme, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2009, at A1 (stating 
that [i]n 2009, Bernie Madoff was sentenced to 150 years in federal prison for conducting the 
largest and most wide-spread Ponzi Scheme in history, which affected billions of dollars held 
by American investors. Madoff’s imposed sentence was three times the recommended length of 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.). 
93 “At the heart of white collar crime is the American dream fueled by our capitalist society 
wherein competition and success are key factors . . . White collar crime comes hand-in-hand 
with capitalism, as corporations compete for the biggest profits and fewest losses. This ruthless 
economic system encourages competitors to work harder than everybody else in order to get 
ahead, which results in a sense of individualism and a lack of awareness of the problems caused 
towards others.” Joseph P. Martinez, Unpublished Criminals: The Social Acceptability of White 
Collar Crimes in America (Apr. 11, 2014) (unpublished thesis, Eastern Michigan University), 
https://commons.emich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1381&context=honors. See generally 
SOLTES, supra note 26 (discussing an empirical understanding of why white collar criminals 
“commit” these offenses. Soltes interviewed multiple corporate executives that committed 
financial reporting fraud, insider trading, deceptive financial structuring, and Ponzi schemes—
including the infamous Bernie Madoff.). 
94 Since 2013, individuals who commit embezzlement and theft routinely comprise the 
largest type of white-collar offender. They annually represent between 24.6% to 28.3% of all 
economic crime offenders. Offenders that commit credit card fraud are a distant third. U.S. 
Semisch, supra note 22, at 7. 
95 Other white-collar crimes where loss is at the heart of the offense include “bank fraud, 
blackmail, bribery, counterfeiting, credit card fraud, embezzlement, extortion, forgery insider 
trading, insurance fraud, investment schemes, securities fraud, tax evasion, advanced fee 
scams, service and repair scams, as well as Ponzi & pyramid schemes . . . .” Martinez, supra 
note 93, at 5. 
96 USSG § 2B1.1(b); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2913.02(B)(2) (West 2014). 
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Federal Sentencing Guidelines97 
Loss Amount Increase in Offense Level 
$6,500 or less No Increase 
More than $6,500 Add 2 
More than $15,000 Add 4 
More than $40,000 Add 6 
More than $95,000 Add 8 
More than $150,000 Add 10 
More than $250,000 Add 12 
More than $550,000 Add 14 
More than $1,500,000 Add 1698 
More than $2,500,000 Add 18 
More than $9,500,000 Add 20 
More than $25,000,000 Add 22 
More than $65,000,000 Add 24 
More than $150,000,000 Add 26 
More than $250,000,000 Add 28 
More than $550,000,000 Add 30 
  
Ohio Revised Code99 
Loss Amount Increase in Offense Level 
$1,000 – $7,499 5th Degree Felony 
$7,500 – $149,999 4th Degree Felony 
$150,000 – $749,999 3rd Degree Felony 
$750,000 – $1,500,000 2nd Degree Felony 
$1,500,000 & above 1st Degree Felony 
 
As demonstrated above, the required threshold loss amount for a theft felony in 
Ohio is $1,000.100 Essentially, the Code provides that a defendant who stole $7,500 
 
97 USSG § 2B1.1. This offense table applies to “larceny, embezzlement, and other forms of 
theft; offenses involving stolen property; property damage or destruction; fraud and deceit; 
forgery; offenses involving altered or counterfeit instruments other than counterfeit bearer 
obligation of the United States.” 
98 Ohio’s maximum threshold loss amount is $1,500,000. O.R.C. § 2913.02. 
99 Id. 
100 Alison Lawrence, Making Sense of Sentencing: State Systems and Policies 2 (National 
Conference of State Legislatures, June 2015), 
https://www.ncsl.org/documents/cj/sentencing.pdf. Ohio is one of nineteen states, plus the 
District of Columbia, to have a $1,000 state felony threshold amount. New Jersey and Virginia 
have the lowest state felony threshold amount, $200, while Wisconsin has the highest state 
felony threshold amount, $2,500. Ohio should consider raising its felony threshold amount so 
the state can focus on sentencing the most serious offenders, rather than the low-level 
offenders. Id. 
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receives the same punishment as a defendant that stole nearly $150,000.101 Whereas, 
the federal system provides three different loss levels between this wide range. Section 
2B1.1 allows intermediate thresholds at $15,000, $40,000, and $95,000 before 
reaching $150,000. Hence, white-collar criminal defendants in Ohio have a 
substantially higher chance of receiving a longer prison sentence due to Ohio’s large 
and inappropriate organization of these threshold loss amounts. Similar to federal 
sentencing ranges, smaller ranges for loss amounts in Ohio can help reduce the 
sentence for a white-collar criminal defendant. 
However, in 2015, the U.S. Sentencing Commission proposed numerous 
amendments to Section 2B1.1 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.102 Specifically, 
one change was the new sentencing factor of “substantial financial hardship” to 
victims.103 Under the original sentencing analysis, an offender received a harsher 
punishment when they impacted fifty or more individuals.104 Now, the new model 
allows the same sentence for the same amount of money that affects less people.105 
Therefore, an offender who embezzles or steals $1,000,000 from one person or fifty-
one people can receive the same punishment. 
B. Ohio Should Implement a White-Collar Sentencing Matrix Similar to 
Pennsylvania’s Tailored Sentencing Matrices for Criminal Conduct 
Various states had already adopted similar structures of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, even before the federal structure became a national success.106 In 1982, 
Pennsylvania was the second state to draft and implement state sentencing 
guidelines.107 On September 13, 2012, Pennsylvania approved the Seventh Edition of 
its Sentencing Guidelines.108  
 
101 O.R.C. § 2913.02. In Ohio, a defendant that stole nearly twenty times more than another 
can receive the same punishment. 
102 See Frank O. Bowman, III, Comment on Proposed Amendments to Economic Crime 
Guideline, §2 B.1.1 (Feb. 19, 2015), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-
process/public-hearings-and-meetings/20150312/Bowman.pdf. 
103 United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, § 2B1.1(b) (2018). 
104 United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, § 2B1.1(b)(2) (2014). 
105 Id. § 2B1.1(b). 
106 Pennsylvania enacted the sentencing guidelines to promote uniformity and consistency 
in sentencing for defendants. Jodeen M. Hobbs, Structuring Sentencing Discretion in 
Pennsylvania: Are Guidelines Still a Viable Option in Light of Commonwealth v. Devers?, 69 
TEMP. L. REV. 941, 960 (1996). Washington, New Jersey, and Minnesota also have similar 
structures to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Daniel A. Chatham, Playing with Post-
Booker Fire: The Dangers of Increased Judicial Discretion in Federal White Collar 
Sentencing, 32 J. CORP. L. 619, 625 (2007). 
107 ROBINA INST. OF CRIM. L. AND CRIM. JUST., JURISDICTION PROFILE: PENNSYLVANIA 
(2018). The Guidelines were invalidated due to a procedural error, but new guidelines became 
effective in 1988. 
108 Sentencing Guidelines and Implementations Manuals, PA. COMM’N ON SENTENCING, 
http://pcs.la.psu.edu/guidelines/sentencing/sentencing-guidelines-and-implementation-
manuals (last visited Oct. 14, 2018). 
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Pennsylvania’s sentencing structure incorporates three important features that can 
help remedy problems the Federal Sentencing Guidelines do not address. First, the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines only apply to felonies and class A misdemeanors; 
whereas Pennsylvania’s Sentencing Guidelines apply to all felonies and 
misdemeanors.109 Second, Pennsylvania state judges are required to disclose in open 
court the purpose and reasons of the imposed sentence for felonies and 
misdemeanors.110 Third, and most importantly, Pennsylvania’s unique matrix 
structure for specific criminal conduct can help remedy the sentencing disparity in 
Ohio for white-collar criminal defendants.  
Pennsylvania’s sentencing requirements are codified in the Pennsylvania State 
Code.111 However, the Pennsylvania Sentencing Commission issued an 
Implementation Manual.112 This manual is similar to the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines Manual because it is extremely simple in assisting citizens and 
practitioners to understand the consequences of criminal conduct. To determine the 
guideline sentence,113 a judge in Pennsylvania must first determine the Offense 
Gravity Score of the current misconduct114 and examine the defendant’s prior 
record.115 Once these scores are determined, the court may apply an enhancement116 
or any aggravating or mitigating circumstances.117 Pennsylvania utilizes six different 
matrices for sentencing defendants.118 For example, if an enhancement applies, then 
 
109 204 PA. CONST. STAT. § 303.1(a) (2019). 
110 Id. § 303.1(d). This statute states “[i]n every case in which a court of record imposes a 
sentence for a felony or misdemeanor, the court shall make as a part of the record, and disclose 
in open court at the time of sentencing, a statement of the reason or reasons for the sentence 
imposed.” 
111 See generally id. § 303.1. 
112 Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing, Sentencing Guidelines Implementation 
Manual (7th ed. 2012). 
113 204 PA. CONST. STAT. § 303.2(a). 
114 Id. § 303.3; see also Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing, supra note 112, at 99. 
The Offense Gravity Score “measures the seriousness of the current conviction.” Similar to 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, we can analogize “Offense Gravity Score” with the 
offense level. 
115 204 PA. CONST. STAT. § 303.4(a). A Prior Record Score is “based on the type and number 
of prior convictions . . . . and prior juvenile adjudications . . . . There are eight Prior Record 
Score categories: Repeat Violent Offense (REVOC), Repeat Felony 1 and Felony 2 Offender 
(RFEL), and point-based categories of 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.” 
116 See id. § 303.10. A court may enhance the Offense Gravity Score only under specific 
circumstances. These situations include: if the offender used a deadly weapon, participated in 
a criminal gang, conducted the crime at or near youth or a school, sexually abused a child, 
committed third-degree murder of a victim younger than the age of 13, committed arson, or 
was involved in human trafficking. 
117 See id. § 303.13 for a list of aggravating or mitigating factors. 
118 See id. §§ 303.16(a)–303.18(c). The matrix a court uses depends on the defendant’s 
criminal conduct. There is a unique sentencing matrix for Offenders Under the Age of 18 
Convicted of 1st or 2nd Degree Murder, Possession of a Deadly Weapon, Use of a Deadly 
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the court uses the applicable enhancement matrix; otherwise the court applies the basic 
sentencing matrix.119 The five unique matrices tailor the Offense Gravity Score and 
Prior Record Score to the criminal defendant’s conduct. Hence, when a court uses a 
specific matrix focused on specific criminal conduct, the defendant’s imposed 
sentence is better adapted for the criminal defendant’s wrongdoing. 
Ohio should adopt Pennsylvania’s form of sentencing criminal defendants using 
unique matrices for specific criminal conduct. A critical reason to separate the 
sentencing structure of white-collar crimes from other offenses is the inherent nature 
of the crime. White-collar crimes tend to be non-violent offenses and motivated by 
greed;120 whereas other crimes, such as homicide or rape, are inherently violent and 
motivated by a multitude of factors. Rather than using one basic sentencing matrix, a 
matrix tailored to white-collar criminal conduct would allow offenders to receive a 
fairer sentence. Ohio should create and implement a white-collar matrix with the loss 
threshold amounts on the vertical axis and the defendant’s prior criminal record on the 
horizontal axis. This white-collar matrix would allow Ohio courts to account for the 
criminal defendant’s exact loss amount and specific prior criminal record. 
However, Ohio should avoid one negative aspect of Pennsylvania’s sentencing 
structure—indeterminate sentencing.121 An indeterminate sentence is when a court 
prescribes “a range for the minimum and maximum term”122 or a “maximum prison 
term that the parole board can reduce . . . .”123 Hence, Pennsylvania judges sentence 
defendants for a range of years, rather than a set term. Whereas, a determinate sentence 
imposes fixed sentence durations.124 Unlike Pennsylvania, Ohio primarily utilizes a 
determinate sentencing model.125 Determinate sentencing reduces judicial discretion 
because the judge must sentence a criminal defendant to a specified number of years, 
rather than a range of years.  
 
Weapon, Youth Enhancement Matrix, School Enhancement Matrix, and a Youth and School 
Enhancement Matrix. 
119 See generally id. § 303.16(a). 
120 See Pamela H. Bucy et al., Why Do They Do It?: The Motives, Mores, and Character of 
White Collar Criminals, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 401, 406 (2012). Beyond greed, the top 
motivations included a sense of entitlement, arrogance, competitiveness, and rationalization. 
121 See Angelica L. Revelant, Indeterminate ≠ Immunity: A Review of the Pennsylvania 
Sentencing Guidelines, 110 PENN. ST. L. REV. 187, 189 (2005). 
122 Indeterminate Sentencing, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Indeterminate 
sentencing is also known as discretionary sentencing. Sentencing, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(11th ed. 2019). Hence, since this Note argues that Ohio should reduce judicial discretion, Ohio 
should also avoid discretionary sentencing policies. 
123 Bradley R. Hall, Mandatory Sentencing Guidelines by Any Other Name: When 
“Indeterminate Structured Sentencing” Violates Blakely v. Washington, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 643, 
648 (2009). 
124 See Lawrence, supra note 100, at 4. Determinate sentencing allows for “certainty in the 
amount of time served, improve[d] proportionality of the sentence to the gravity of the offense, 
and reduce[d] disparities that might exist when sentences are more indeterminate.” 
125 Id. at 5. Along with New York and California, Ohio is one of seventeen states and the 
District of Columbia to employ a determinate sentencing model. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
2929.14(A) (West 2018). 
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Unlike a judge’s discretionary power in Ohio, Pennsylvania’s overall sentencing 
structure is highly obligatory for each judge to follow. To support this notion, 
Pennsylvania scored significantly higher on the Sentencing Guideline Continuum 
compared to Ohio.126 Pennsylvania received a score of nine, meaning the state’s 
sentencing model is highly mandatory; whereas Ohio’s sentencing structure is 
basically a voluntary decision for each judge.127 Hence, Ohio should also use 
Pennsylvania as a guide for adopting a new and innovative sentencing matrix for 
white-collar criminal defendants, but constrain the model to determinate sentences. 
C. The Criticisms of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Will Substantially 
Improve Ohio’s Sentencing Structure 
Many scholars and practitioners have heavily criticized the federal government’s 
structure and adoption of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, including section 
2B1.1.128 The Federal Sentencing Guidelines have been criticized as “rules of great 
complexity and rigidity,”129 a “mechanical scoring system,”130 and, in the words of 
Justice Kennedy, “unwise and unjust.”131 Although the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
are not a perfect standard, they provide a more accurate and visible model for 
practitioners, citizens, and criminal defendants. Compared to Ohio’s model, the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines are visible, simple, and efficient. An important and 
positive aspect of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines is their visibility.132 Prior to the 
federal model, sentencing guidelines for any crime were basically invisible to federal 
judges, practitioners, and defendants.133 The current guidelines allow defendants 
reasonable visibility and understanding of their offenses, the variations, and possible 
imposed sentence. Hence, there is reduced secrecy for a defendant that 
misappropriates $100,000 where his conduct falls on the sentencing table.   
 
126 See KAUDER & OSTROM, supra note 80, at 22. This survey specifically measured how 
each state’s sentencing guidelines affect judicial discretion. 
127 Id. at 22; see Koenig, supra note 65. In Cleveland, Ohio, Judge Cassandra Collier-
Williams stated that entering each judge’s courtroom in the Justice Center is like entering a 
different city. Judge Collier-Williams stated, “[t]here’s thirty-four judges up here and it’s like 
thirty-four different cities.” 
128 See generally Part II of Lucian E. Dervan, Sentencing the Wolf of Wall Street: From 
Leniency to Uncertainty, 61 WAYNE L. REV. 91, 107–21 (2015); Andrew Weissmann & 
Joshua A. Block, White-Collar Defendants and White-Collar Crimes, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET 
PART 286 (2007).  
129 Robert Weisberg & Marc L. Miller, Sentencing Lessons, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1, 8 (2005). 
130 Michael Tonry, The Functions of Sentencing and Sentencing Reform, 58 STAN. L. REV. 37, 
46 (2005). 
131 Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Speech at the American Bar Association Annual Meeting 
(Aug. 9, 2003). 
132 Michael Goldsmith & James Gibson, The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: A Surprising 
Success? 15 (NYU Law Sch. Ctr. for Research in Crime & Just., Occsn’l Paper in Crime & 
Just. No. 12, 1999). 
133 Id. 
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A supposed fault of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines is that federal judges have 
“been robbed” of all judicial discretion.134 However, this argument assumes that each 
judge employed a rational and correct model for sentencing defendants before the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines existed.135 Although a federal judge cannot determine 
a defendant’s sentence from scratch, the judge has the final decision on the defendant’s 
sentence within the prescribed statutory range.136 Hence, the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines have not eliminated judicial discretion. Instead, the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines monitor and steer federal judges in a similar direction. Ohio judges would 
immensely benefit from similar judicial discretion constraints because white-collar 
criminal defendants receive vastly different sentences. 
Critics also argue that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are too complex and 
extensive. However, considering the Federal Sentencing Guidelines account for all 
federal felony offenses and class A misdemeanors, a four-hundred-page manual is 
sufficient. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines are organized into eight chapters with 
descriptions of each offense and specific characteristics for that offense. Each crime 
has a corresponding offense level that allows federal judges to apply specific 
enhancements for a particular case.137 Compared to Ohio, practitioners must locate the 
criminal statute, understand the punishment prescribed in the statute, locate Ohio’s 
penalties in the Code, and still leave the defendant’s sentence to the mercy of the 
judge.138 Hence, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are a simple and transparent guide 
for sentencing criminal defendants; whereas the sentencing structure in Ohio leaves 
practitioners and defendants in the dark. Therefore, the “negative aspects” of the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, when compared to Ohio’s sentencing model, actually 
improve the overall purpose and function of sentencing criminal defendants.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
The solution to remedy the sentencing disparity for white-collar criminal 
defendants in Ohio is apparent and simple: adopt the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 
This successful and established national framework can help guide Ohio to implement 
a clear and uniform sentencing structure. Without this vital change, judges in Ohio 
retain vast discretion to determine and implement arbitrary sentences. Judicial 
discretion creates disparities and bias when sentencing any criminal defendant. It is 
common sense that a defendant’s conduct should determine their final punishment, 
not Ohio’s flawed sentencing procedures.  
 
134 Id. at 5. 
135 See generally ANTHONY PARTRIDGE & WILLIAM B. ELDRIDGE, THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
SENTENCING STUDY (1974). The authors conducted a study in the Second Circuit to determine 
the sentencing disparity of federal judges. The authors discovered that before the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines were implemented, there was a wide disparity in sentencing criminal 
defendants. Id. at 9. In particular, the study revealed that the judicial disparity in sentencing in 
the Eastern District of New York casted “doubt on the theory that sentencing councils tend to 
generate common approaches to sentencing . . . .” Id. at 23. See generally Breyer, supra note 
40. 
136 See id. at 19–20. A federal judge has the ability to fluctuate a defendant’s sentence using 
aggravating or mitigating factors. 
137 Id. at 21. 
138 See id. at 27–28. 
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Furthermore, Pennsylvania’s unique and effective matrices provide another tool to 
remedy the sentencing disparities for white-collar criminal defendants. A matrix 
tailored to white-collar crime will substantially reduce judicial discretion in Ohio and 
tailor the defendant’s sentence to their criminal conduct. Although these guidelines 
may not solve every problem, they will help Ohio transition in the right direction for 
sentencing white-collar criminal defendants. These improvements will help Ohio 
comport with the Principle of Legality, reduce judicial discretion, and minimize 
unpredictability in the criminal justice system.139 The reformation of Ohio’s criminal 
sentencing structure is necessary because without guidelines, Ohio judges are left with 
a “difficult, soul-searching task at best.”140 
 
 
139 See supra Section I. 
140 Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, Address at Joint Sentencing Institute of the Sixth, 
Seventh and Eighth Judicial Circuits 6 (Oct. 12, 1961). 
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